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NOBLE CAUSE CORRUPTION: THE WOOD INQUIRY 
 
Noble cause corruption occurs when a person tries to produce a just outcome through unjust 
methods, for example, police manipulating evidence to ensure a conviction of a known 
offender (Punch, 2009). It is a victory of consequentialism over deontology. Unlike monetary 
corruption, such as bribery, it is seen as a positive act by perpetrators. Nonetheless, this type 
of corruption still leads to injustice through the prejudging of an accused by the investigators 
and the inability of this accused to have a fair trial. Noble cause corruption has been the 
subject of a commission of inquiry in Queensland (Lucas, 1977) as well as receiving 
significant attention from more recent inquiries in Queensland (Fitzgerald, 1989), New South 
Wales (Wood, 1997) and Western Australia (Kennedy, 2004). 
 
Corruption is usually addressed through deterrent measures, such as penalties, investigations 
and procedural change. These initiatives are unlikely to halt noble cause corruption as its 
basis lies in an attempt to do good by compensating for the apparent flaws in an unjust 
system. Part of the motivation comes from perceived injustice and incompetence in the 
judicial system. This paper suggests that the solution lies in a change of culture through 
improved leadership and uses the political theories of Roger Myerson to propose one possible 
solution to the problem of noble cause corruption. Myerson studies democratic systems and 
the leadership required to construct and perpetuate such governments but raises a potential 
negative outcome from leadership: “If political leaders do not support the standards for 
evaluating and rewarding the service of administrators in government bureaucracies then 
these standards cannot be maintained against temptations of corruption.” (Myerson, 2011, pp. 
6-7)  
 
This paper will commence with a discussion of police corruption and noble cause corruption. 
Then it will discuss the importance of leadership in police culture. Finally, evidence from the 
Wood Inquiry will be examined to determine whether there are indications that Myerson’s 
thesis would provide an answer to noble cause corruption.  
 
Types of Police Corruption 
Police have been known to engage in a range of corrupt activity. Police jobs that involve a 
high degree of discretion are more likely to be exposed to corruption (Heidenheimer & 
Johnston, 2002). Also the opportunities to enact deviance vary depending on the 
2 
 
organisational structure, with some officers having more power than others (Barker & Carter, 
1991, p. 49).  Nonetheless, by their nature, most police duties have many opportunities to 
accept bribes to make particular decisions which assist crimes or criminals.  
 
Police corruption falls into two categories: grass-eating, such as accepting free, inexpensive 
privileges (e.g. free coffee, meals, etc) or meat-eating which covers all forms of graft 
recognised by mainstream society, including bribes from criminals (Knapp, 1972, p. 4; 
Punch, 2009, p. 29). These categories can fall on a scale from occupational deviance, when 
rules are bent to an employee’s advantage and at the expense of the organisation (e.g. from 
workplace theft to crimes committed by police officers; Punch, 2009, p. 34). Noble cause 
corruption is also known as process corruption; the manipulation of the justice system, 
usually to ensure a conviction. However, it subverts the justice system by removing the 
opportunity for a fair trial and relying on proof beyond a reasonable doubt as the basis of 
guilt.  There is a history of this type of corruption being very common across Australia 
(Lucas, 1977, p. 14).  
 
Police Culture   
Police work is dangerous and the officers unpopular; yet they are stigmatised by society and 
criticised for any real or perceived excessive action. There is a distinctive police culture 
driven by police work (Chan, 1999, p. 136), with positive outcomes which can assist the 
functioning, survival and security among officers; and negative outcomes which can allow 
corruption to flourish and facilitate the protection of wrongdoers from prosecution (Chan, 
1999). Most police organisations possess the qualities of a subculture setting police apart 
from society with a group-think, ‘us v. them’ attitude (Sewell, 1999, p. 156). Corrupt conduct 
can be perpetuated when a pattern of such behaviour becomes ingrained in a police pattern of 
socialisation (Barker & Carter, 1991, p. 50). Group support for rule violations provides the 
conduct with a backbone (Barker & Carter, 1991, p. 52).  
Police culture can drive compliance. According to social identity theory, when a person 
becomes part of a group they usually take on the beliefs and values of the group. This is 
reinforced by the natural desire to be liked (Brown & Abrams, 2003) and not cause social 
friction (Coady, 1996). Group members emulate the ethics of their peers and prefer them, 
even over those of direct authority figures (Granitz & Ward, 2001). Consequently, a person 
feels he will ‘join in’ and act unethically rather than letting his friends down (Beck, 1999, p. 
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145; Grossman, 1995, p. 153; Weber, Kurke, & Pentico, 2003). In order to function in society 
individuals make decisions based on inductive logic; they rely on their own experiences and 
the lessons of their culture and society to create rules (heuristics) or mental shortcuts, which 
they use to help them make quick judgements in otherwise complex situations (Cukier, 
Nesselroth, & Cody, 2007).  
 
Police officers, as upholders of the law, are also susceptible to establishing moral distance. 
Moral distance has two components: components: the punishment justification that is 
showing the person is guilty of a punishable/vengeful act, and the legal affirmation that is 
affirming the legitimacy of your own cause in acting against them (Grossman, 1995, pp. 165-
167). This position psychologically allows an officer to justify unethical acts (e.g. verballing 
on the basis that the person is guilty and deserves to be punished). Police can have a tendency 
to see themselves as the ‘white hats’ or good guys in the community. While this is literally 
true there is a danger that entire groups, rather than offending individuals, are depicted as 
“malicious, alien forces intruding on the world of well-meaning, unsuspecting, virtuous 
people.” (Baumeister, 1997, p. 89)  
 
Leadership 
The foundation of the state must be built upon leaders who are elected into power by the 
support of their followers. This support is motivated by the expectation of future rewards 
upon their success and the expectation that their leaders will always serve responsibly 
(Myerson, 2006). Leadership has a significant role in producing ethical or unethical practice 
within any organisation, including a police force. Police may perform unethical acts through 
the direction of a superior, to emulate the actions of a respected person of higher rank so as 
not to endanger the opportunity for promotion. It is more likely that an officer will comply if 
the superior is able to observe whether compliance occurs. The superior may also obtain 
compliance by providing absolution for misdeeds, that is, the superior says that he or she 
alone will wear responsibility for actions performed by the actor (Bauman, 1989, pp. 21-22). 
Nonetheless some officers will still comply out of respect. The inclination to obey is affected 
by: 
 Social education through school and work telling us to follow orders; 
 The officer has to make a decision between a possible wrong action and an actual 
wrong disobedience. The choice is difficult but obedience is more likely; 
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 The fact that most people do not like to second guess superiors. The superior has all 
the facts whereas the actor has only their narrow perspective (Baumeister, 1997, pp. 
267-268). 
 
Moral Hazard  
Moral hazard is fundamental to the state given that its laws can only be enforced by 
appropriate actions from state officials and agents, such as police officers (Myerson, 2011, p. 
4). As the government is a network made up of agents, on various levels, holding different 
levels of power, government agents have the opportunity to abuse their power (Myerson, 
2011). In order for police officers to be more inclined to behave in a manner that is consistent 
with the government and society expectations, long-term rewards for serving the state, called 
moral hazard rents (as incentives for not abusing their power) must outweigh the benefits 
gained from engaging in corrupt activities (Myerson, 2011). This is referred to as the moral 
hazard problem and is defined as: “the problem of creating incentives for agents to behave in 
some prescribed manner when their behaviour cannot be directly observed by other.” 
(Myerson, 2011, p. 2) 
 
A police officers incentives or rewards, depends on the judgements of their superiors and 
therefore the incentives will depend on the top leaders in the organisation (Myerson, 2011). 
Some officers have been more inclined to escalate their career prospects by engaging in 
corrupt acts, such as falsifying evidence, accepting bribes or planting fake evidence in order 
to get a conviction in the hope that they will be rewarded by their superiors. Thus, there is a 
moral hazard problem at the top leadership as agents must trust that their superiors will judge 
their performance in a positive manner and will reward them accordingly. Similarly, Alchian 
and Demsetz (1972) called this ‘the metering problem in firms’. Therefore, organisations 
must promise and provide rewards to its agents as well as trust that the organisation will 
implement the terms properly.  
 
The existence of noble cause corruption is proof of the efficacy of the moral hazard problem 
in policing, but it does not ensure that the problem is addressed. Integrity systems are not 
always effective against corruption. Becker and Stigler (1974, p. 3) identify that the level of 
enforcement will depend on a variety of factors. First, is the degree of honesty of the 
enforcers; thus the police who investigate the police may share the same corruption. Also, 
some otherwise honest enforcers will condone the noble cause corruption. Second, is the 
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structure of incentives to honesty; the practice will continue if the perpetrators obtain greater 
rewards from the act than the investigators do from successful investigation. Third, it depends 
on the frequency and visibility of the violation; it is harder to detect if it does not happen 
most of the time in a regular pattern. Fourthly, crimes, such as bribery, that do not produce an 
aggrieved victim are harder to detect. Noble cause corruption does produce an aggrieved 
victim but they may not complain. 
 
Given that noble cause corruption will be hard to detect, and thus difficult to stop through 
integrity regimes, we need to find a solution that relies on incentives. The aim of this paper is 
to identify rewards for the police that are not a moral hazard. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Data was obtained from the transcripts of hearings of the Wood Royal Commission (Wood, 
1997) testimony of officers who had agreed to cooperate with the Inquiry and discuss their 
corrupt behaviour. This study has concentrated on those officers who worked in and around 
Kings Cross to ensure that there is some uniformity of background in the evidence. The study 
also concentrates on their admissions in relation to the types of noble cause corruption in 
which they participated and the rationalisations of that corruption they provided to the 
Inquiry.  
 
The researchers read the material on the first reading without preconceptions to allow for 
unanticipated material emerging from the data, in other words a grounded theory approach 
(Noaks & Wincup, 2004). Once the material was gathered it was coded. The coding process 
included developing sensitising concepts derived from the literature to direct the 
classification of material (Patton, 2002). Next open coding was conducted to identify new 
issues that did not appear in the existing literature (Noaks & Wincup, 2004), otherwise 
known as testing emergent themes (Marshall & Rossman, 1999). Finally the material was 
collated into groups to formulate arguments and theories concerning the generalisability of 
findings.  
 
DATA 
The police officers in the study admitted to a wide range of noble cause corruption. The 
corrupt activity took place at three stages: arrest, interview and when giving evidence in 
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court. Each of the practices mentioned below were related by the witnesses to rationalisations 
provided in the next section.  
 
Arrest 
Some officers who could not obtain evidence for a charge would give drug dealers a “stern 
talking to” to show them that the police were “in charge of the street” (Pentland, p.10401). 
They also participated in harassment, such as following a known drug dealer everywhere 
three steps behind, so they could not operate, with the intention of forcing them to leave the 
area.  
It was – yes only if they’d swallowed the caps on us or if we’d turned them over a 
couple of times during the shift and we just got sick of them and there was nothing on. 
It was just Howard’s and my sense of humour. It was probably not a bad policing 
technique, I suppose, get them out of the area. (Pentland, p.10498) 
 
Others would get around the lack of evidence by loading up, that is, placing drugs back on a 
dealer so that charges could be laid. Haken preferred to say that “...evidence was manipulated 
to achieve certain ends... merely a return of certain property to the possession of the person 
who had previously had it.” (Haken, p.11935) Police would also load up a person with drugs 
to increase the severity of a charge: “The ambition was to make the matter more serious in 
the eyes of the court and to make it apparent on the street that he had overstepped the mark, 
to take him down a peg or two...” (Haken, p.12010) Alternatively, police would change 
evidence to a lesser charge as a trade for information either immediately or to cultivate an 
informer (Scullion, p.9959).  
 
Interview 
Police should give a caution to an accused before commencing an interview. However, police 
knew that if you gave a caution then the accused would just shut up, and in the 1970s and 
early ‘80s, “you were looked upon as a fool if you actually cautioned someone.” (Scullion, 
p.9901) Police would retrospectively claim that a caution was given.  This practice was 
prevented with the introduction of the requirement to electronically record interviews 
(Scullion, p.9960). However, police would still have a preamble conversation with an 
accused to induce them to make a confession, even though you know this would make the 
confession inadmissible (Scullion, p.9900). Verballing was also used but not as the sole 
evidence against an accused: “… but with those verbal admission, there’s also circumstantial 
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evidence that accompanies that admission, which includes sometimes photographs at the 
banks, firearms, shoes.” (Swan, p.9786) However, some police also extorted money out of 
known criminals who paid to ensure they would not be arrested and verballed (Haken, 
p.14280). 
 
Giving Evidence in Court 
A fundamental rule of court proceedings is that witnesses not discuss their evidence with 
other persons in order to ensure that they only reflect their own testimony. All police 
participated in sharing information before a trial between witnesses, both police and civilian. 
They did this in three ways. First, some said that they were simply trying to cover gaps in 
their story, not invent new evidence – “I don’t think it was a matter of working out false 
evidence. You have to look through the brief and you check it out and say, ‘Oh, we are 
missing something here.” (Demole, p. 9736)1 Alternatively, it was used to fix up sloppy cases 
(Demole, p. 9739). Interestingly one of Demole’s complaints was that defence witnesses 
always did this (Demole, p. 9685). Others said that these scrum-downs were designed to 
refresh memory not invent new evidence – “there wasn’t anything sinister in that” (Scullion, 
p.9890) 
A. … everybody discussed the case before it and you read through the statement 
to refresh your memories to give evidence. You were involved in that many 
matters, you know, you’ve got to refresh your memory somewhere. Most of 
the briefs are usually finished within three or four days of arrest… 
Q.  So there was no adding to statements and change statements? 
A. No. (Demole, p.9743) 
But they were aware this practice was illicit and were told to never admit they had done it 
(Scullion, p.9891). 
 
Second, police incorporated material from civilian’s evidence into their own. This was 
because civilian witnesses were unreliable; they may not tell the same story as their original 
evidence or even show up to court.  
A. So if you had information from a civilian about what they’d heard or what 
they’d seen, you might try to incorporate that into your evidence. 
                                                            
1 All references in this section refer to Wood 1995 and provide the witness’ name and the page reference.  
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Q. Either in the form of a verbal admission or by substituting yourself for the 
witness? 
A.  Basically, yes. 
Q. That kept the briefs smaller and more manageable? 
A.  Yes… 
q.  I imagine that, on these occasions, you might be somewhat fortified by doing 
this in the knowledge that, ‘Well, at least the civilian said he saw or heard this, 
so it’s not as though I’m making all this up; I’m just delivering the evidence 
that would otherwise be given by them’? 
A. That’s correct. (Scullion, p.9892) 
 
Third, primary officers prepared statements for junior officers as a means of saving time 
(Haken, p.14417). 
 
The final type of noble cause corruption was designed to protect police from investigations 
by Internal Affairs (IA), the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) or the 
Wood Inquiry. They would always tell other police when they are under investigation 
(Demole, p.9685; Scullion, p.9949). They would advise the officer that there was a “Whale in 
the Bay”, in other words, there was an investigation into that officer’s actions (Haken, 
p.14323) 
 
Reasons for corruption 
As discussed above, the NSW police had a distinct culture and saw themselves, accurately or 
inaccurately, in an ‘us versus them’ situation (Chan, 1996; Sewell, 1999). This applied in a 
number of directions. Any bodies which investigated police were the enemy. “Yes, it’s like 
the enemy. Internal Affairs, Internal Security, The Royal Commission, ICAC – they’re all the 
enemy.” (Demole, p.9671) Police referred to a need to ‘cover your arse’ in the sense of 
covering themselves from inquiries into their behaviour by bodies such as Internal Affairs 
(IA) (Demole, p.9579). Demole regarded it as a “built-in thing” in the police force (Demole, 
p.9700). The need to cover your arse was taught at the academy but from the perspective of 
‘do nothing wrong’. Officers twisted this reasoning by extending it to providing protection 
from investigation – “cover your tracks” (Demole, p.9760).  Attached to this was the need to 
respect the Code of Silence. As Demole put it “don’t be a give-up” (Demole, p.9672) Haken 
said he would not break the code even when he saw some activities that he regarded as wrong 
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(Haken, p.14270). Having said that, there were always a small minority who did not 
participate in noble cause corruption and these actions had to be kept secret from them 
(Demole, p.9739; Scullion, p.9901; Haken, p.11817). All mentioned that if they did not join 
in to noble cause corruption they would have been ostracised (Demole, p.9587; Swan, 
p.9786; Scullion, p.9889). Joining in was extremely important as the police force was a 
‘brotherhood’ (Demole, p.9587).   
 
On the whole there was no faith in the judicial system which was regarded as a “joke” 
(Demole, p.9685). The rules of evidence were too tough and penalties were too weak 
(Demole, p.9711). Still they claimed that they only used noble cause corruption on minor 
matters and very rarely on a matter that would lead to imprisonment and then only for terms 
of less than 12 months (Demole, p.9741). It was usually drug supply matters as there were no 
independent witnesses (Demole, p.9743).  Demole said that when he worked at the DEA he 
did not need to falsify evidence as that section had the resources “... like listening devices, 
telephone intercepts, undercover operatives, video surveillance...” that made it unnecessary 
(Demole, p.9743). Likewise Scullion (p.9902) said that these techniques were less necessary 
with the introduction of better forensic methods. 
 
They learnt heuristics of noble cause corruption by osmosis through copying the actions of 
their peers. They were not instructed on how to behave but followed the example of more 
senior officers (Demole, p.9633; Scullion, p.9893; Haken, p.14270). All these practices were 
passed down to an officer on joining the force and then passed on by him to the next 
generations as standard procedure (Scullion, p.9961). Having good evidence was not always 
guaranteed to get a conviction (Swan, p.9787). They justified manipulation of evidence or 
verballing by saying it was only done to criminals who were guilty (Demole, p.9684; 
Scullion, p.9894) or to “lock up an active drug dealer who couldn’t be locked up 
legitimately” (Haken, p.11821). “The actions of the police was certainly accepted by the 
courts and it was my belief that that was not accepted blindly on a lot of occasions.” (Haken, 
p.14278)  
 
This behaviour was not constant and all police saw themselves as working hard and 
producing otherwise honest work and said that most evidence given was entirely proper 
(Demole, p.9631; Haken, pp.11871 & 11935 & 14262 & 14311). Swearing false evidence 
was a rare occurrence (Demole, p.9739; Haken, p.11821). They took great pride in their work 
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and obtained job satisfaction (Demole, p.9633; Haken, p.14275). There was no attempt to try 
and reconcile the two attitudes; they did not see themselves as working in a contradictory 
manner (Demole, p.9711). “I don’t know that I reconciled – the situation was in existence and 
that’s just the way it was.” (Haken, p.14292) They were not renegades (Haken, p.11822). 
They were aware that they were acting against the law and ensured they were not discovered 
(Haken 11871). But they thought these actions were necessary to do their job.  
 
They also reversed the situation to paint themselves as victims. They claimed that criminals 
used the same techniques: “Sir, with verbal evidence, people, or offenders, there are other 
times – what I’m trying to say is that they are making the excuse they were verballed, where 
there is something ether to suggest that they, in fact, committed the crime.” (Swan, p.9788) 
Similarly, the integrity services used the techniques on police. Pentland (p.10467) claimed 
that IA arrested him in front of the detective’s class, put him through 5 hours of intimidation 
before the commencement of an interview, threatened him and made false claims that they 
found drugs in his locker, and then verballed him. “I haven’t treated an offender or an alleged 
offender as I was treated [by IA].” (Pentland, p.10470) He was offended that this was done to 
him by policemen that he thought where “like one of us” (Pentland, p.10471). Warning of a 
Whale in the Bay was not seen as corrupt and almost all officers would give the warning as 
part of the extension of the us vs. them attitude (Haken, p.14234). The culture of the police 
force and connections across branches allowed them to know about every inquiry.  
 
ANALYSIS 
The failure of leadership (Myerson, 2011) is clear in the universal distrust of the judicial 
system, and to some extent the community, by the police. The data shows that NSW police 
suffered from a lack of inclusion. They felt that they were suffering from ostracisation from 
the community they were protecting. This took three forms: 
1. Lack of support to do their job properly due to inadequate laws of evidence, 
2. Being undermined by the courts system who would reverse their good work, 
3. Receiving worse treatment through noble cause corruption by the integrity services. 
 
In order for police officers to be more inclined to behave in a manner that is consistent with 
the expectations of the police organisation, long-term rewards or incentives for not abusing 
their power must outweigh the benefits gained from engaging in corrupt activities (Myerson, 
2011).  In this case the incentives to abuse power far outweighed the incentives to administer 
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power in a manner consistent with the rules and regulations outlined by the police 
organisation. Essentially, they were breaking the law to enforce it. 
 
It is clear that noble cause corruption is directly related to a desire to perform their job 
correctly, that is, arrest and convict criminals. While the officers who gave evidence 
participated in monetary corruption, they all also noted that other officers who were not 
taking graft engaged in evidence manipulation. This is supported by evidence from the 
Fitzgerald Inquiry in Queensland (Fitzgerald, 1989; Herbert & Gilling, 2004). Thus the 
reward they sought was job satisfaction. The key solution is identified in the transcripts by 
the police themselves. They had no need for noble cause corruption when they were given the 
means to obtain conclusive evidence, through better powers and, especially, suitable 
equipment. This is a question of resources and the advancement of technology, however, the 
officers found sufficient technological support in the 1980s and ‘90s to obviate the need for 
evidence manipulation. A reliance on technology need not infringe on civil liberties or lower 
standards of proof, and can directly address the types of noble cause corruption that arose in 
the evidence, for example, surveillance that can prove a person is dealing and improve the 
ability to catch them when they have drugs in their possession, can remove the need to load 
up evidence or harass dealers. So just as technology in the form of the recording of police 
interviews has reduced the ability to verbal, it can in turn be used to reduce the need for 
verballing in the eyes of police.  
 
The technological changes could be supported by better communication with the legal 
profession and judiciary. Courts and the judicial system could improve communication by 
explaining sentencing and, through close work with the offices of Directors of Public 
Prosecutions, better guide investigations to obtain the maximum charge. Rewards for success 
may reduce the stigmatisation of police and the social distance between them and the 
community. But police have to accept that they may suffer from confirmation bias 
(Nickerson, 1998); they may convince themselves of someone’s guilt and, supported by 
punishment justification and legal affirmation, pursue, charge and load up a person under an 
entirely incorrect presumption. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has examined the instances and motivations for noble cause corruption perpetrated 
by NSW police officers. The overall findings are that officers were motivated to indulge in 
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this type of corruption through a desire to produce convictions where they felt the system 
unfairly worked against their ability to do their job correctly. This was supported by a culture 
of exclusion which depicted police as a victimised group which was stigmatised and 
oppressed by the judicial system and the community. Myerson has pointed out that a 
democracy will not succeed unless officers like the police are rewarded for supporting the 
regime. These rewards raise a moral hazard that they will produce undemocratic outcomes, 
such as, in this case noble cause corruption. We have added to the literature by demonstrating 
that the rewards can be positive. Police are seeking job satisfaction through the ability to 
convict the guilty. They will be able to do this through better equipment and investigative 
powers. This initiative along with better communication between the police and judicial 
system can not only reduce the need for noble cause corruption but also potentially lessen the 
negative perceptions of the system held by the police culture.  
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